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The macroeconomic experience has been somewhat ambiguous dur-
ing the historic experiment of economic transition in the former centrally-
planed countries in Central and East Europe (CEE). The economic
restructuring produced a notable catching-up in terms of productiv-
ity but also a J-curve shape of output growth accompanied by an
increase in unemployment on a large scale. This paper models the
transformation progress which leads to these contradictory outcomes.
Before transition initiated catching-up, the economies su⁄ered from
two limits to growth: a gap of usable capital and a gap of technologies.
Accordingly, a rapid technology transfer from the advanced Western
economies led to a signi￿cant technological and structural change com-
bined with high rates of labor reallocation. If we include frictions in
the consequent matching between job seekers and jobs, the model re-
produces the pattern of productivity, growth and unemployment that
we ￿nd in the CEE countries.
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11 Introduction
At the end of the 1980s, the fall of the Iron Curtain initiated rapid changes
in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. The political rev-
olution in these countries was accompanied by a revolution in institutional,
organizational and technological knowledge. Deep changes in the industrial
structure and the organization of ￿rms followed from the removal of state
control over economic activities and the sudden availability of international
know-how, which political barriers blocked before. Free entrepreneurship
and the new integration into the global market for ideas enabled a technol-
ogy transfer from the advanced Western economies to the CEE countries, but
the macroeconomic e⁄ects of the technological and organizational progress
have not been as clearly positive as one might expect. Indeed, with the start
of the economic transition in the 1990s labor productivity grew substantially
in most industries and in most CEE economies. However, the sharp drop in
the amount produced and the massive increase in unemployment contrasted
the productivity gains at the beginning of the economic reforms.
Sachs (1996) summarizes the areas a⁄ected by economic transition in
terms of four basic tasks of economic reform: systemic transformation, ￿-
nancial stabilization, structural adjustment, and the implementation of a
framework to achieve catching-up growth. Although all four tasks are cer-
tainly interrelated, this paper has its focus on the two aspects structural
adjustments and long-run growth. The link between both is that while new
￿rms and industries arise and old ones disappear during the transition, this
turnover is associated with the implementation of innovative technologies
and new forms of organization which generate growth. We can understand
this approach as the continuing production and productivity perspective of
economic transition, under the assumption of already well established insti-
tutional reforms and ￿nancial stabilization.1
From the view of the growth literature, economies may have fallen be-
hind in terms of relative income levels because of a gap in valuable objects,
such as roads and factories, and an idea gap, which means that their citi-
1Institutional change in CEE did not always mean more individual freedom and higher
economic e¢ ciency as new regulations and new institutions have been established. These
regulations sometimes had negative e⁄ects on employment and growth, which can be
observed particularly in East Germany, where the West German legal and institutional
framework has been adopted over night (see, for example, Sinn and Sinn, 1992, and
Riphahn et al., 2001).
2zens do not have access to the ideas that are used in the advanced economies
to generate economic value (Romer, 1993). Capital accumulation, interna-
tional knowledge-spillovers and education2 can bridge the gaps and stimulate
catching-up growth which enables the transition to a high income equilib-
rium. In contrast to other examples of catching-up growth, such as many
Asian economies, the so-called "big-bang" reforms in many CEE countries
initiated a shock therapy including the sudden access to the technology
￿ ows among the most advanced economies. The corresponding deep struc-
tural changes required economic responses at short notice. As this cannot
always be the case, it is obvious that economic development will not follow
a smooth path.
The CEE economies show a very similar pattern of the evolution of pro-
ductivity, unemployment and growth. Hence, a theory of transition has to
explain these apparently connected developments. The maybe most striking
stylized fact about the macroeconomic pattern of transition is the J-Curve
of output growth, that is highly negative rates of output growth at the
beginning followed by a considerable recovery. Explanations for the output
decline in the early stage of transition include, for example, demand and sta-
bilization e⁄ects (e.g., Rosati, 1994) and frictions in establishing new trade
relations after the price liberalization (Roland and Verdier, 1999). The high
unemployment can be seen as the result of high labor ￿ ows and low matching
rates during transition. Svejnar (1996) reviews this part of the literature.
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and Blanchard (1996, 1997) suggest realloca-
tion from existing to new ￿rms and restructuring of existing state ￿rms as
the basic mechanisms to account for both the increasing joblessness and the
nonlinear growth dynamics in transition.
In this paper we refer to the idea that restructuring characterizes the
transition economies and we assume that transition particularly means clos-
ing an idea gap and catching-up with frontier knowledge about technologies.
The catching-up results from technology transfers and adjustments in the
capital stock which involves elements of capital accumulation and capital re-
structuring. Furthermore, bridging the technology gap is a source of growth
which is associated with structural adjustments and labor reallocation. As
Haltiwanger et al. (2003) summarize the ￿ndings on job creation and job
2The idea that human capital is essential for catching-up growth via technological
di⁄usion goes back to Nelson and Phelps (1966). Furthermore, see Keller (2000) for the
role of international technology spillovers in less developed economies.
3destruction in transition economies, the transition entails large-scale ￿ ows
in the labor market, in particular at the beginning of the transformation
process. From this it follows that employment declines if frictions hinder a
perfect reallocation of workers from one to another employment.
The main purpose of the paper is to provide a united (macroeconomic)
explanation for the output fall, the sharp rise in unemployment and produc-
tivity increases during economic transition. The innovative approach is to
consider technological obsolescence and labor reallocation as major results
of economic restructuring which lead to unemployment and an output fall
as the integral part of the catching-up process during transition. We can
show that the model reproduces the stylized facts of the CEE macroeco-
nomic transition: The J-curve shape of output growth, the sharp increase in
unemployment, and high but decreasing e¢ ciency gains. We then run some
simulations of the model which show how the transition process depends on
the parameter speci￿cations. While the basic pattern of the transition dy-
namics is robust to parameter changes, initial economic conditions, such as
the size of the technology gap and frictions in the labor market, determine
whether the macroeconomic responses to the technology transfer are more
moderate or explosive. One can use this information to get an idea of why
some transition economies experienced a higher and some a lower volatility
in productivity, growth and unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
macroeconomic e⁄ects of the economic transition in selected CEE countries.
In section three, we develop the model of technology transfer and show how
it a⁄ects employment and growth in the transition to a long-run equilibrium.
Section four discusses variations in the growth and employment paths which
yield from di⁄erent parameter speci￿cations in the simulation. Finally, sec-
tion ￿ve concludes.
2 The Evolution of Productivity, Growth and Un-
employment during Transition
Economic transition in the CEE countries towards open and market-oriented
economies had strong, but mixed, macroeconomic e⁄ects (see for example
Winieki, 1993; Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Taking di⁄erences in the extent
and the timing of the reforms into account, we can observe a pattern of the
4evolution of labor productivity, output growth, and unemployment, which
is nearly the same in the CEE countries. Figures 1 to 3 show these develop-
ments for the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Slovakia
(SK), Slovenia (SI), and East Germany (EG). The maybe most distinctive
feature in the ￿gures, and according to Blanchard (1996, p. 117) "the major
theoretical challenge facing economist working on transition", is the J-curve
of output growth. After initial declines in output levels, often with double-
digit negative growth rates, a recovery followed three to four years after the
￿rst steps have been undertaken to reform the CEE economies. The growth
rates in the years after the output drop showed the usual variations but
were higher on average than the rates in most other European countries.
However, one can identify a slight decrease in the rates since the mid 1990s
when GDP of the six countries grew up to 5% on average.
In contrast to GDP, labor productivity did not show a clear fall when
economic transition began. Instead, productivity increased, or at least it
decreased not very much, in the two years of the output drop.3 More-
over, productivity growth peaked in the early phase of transition, when all
countries could achieve rates of productivity growth of more than 10%, and
followed a downward trend afterwards.
Related to the growth puzzle is the question of why unemployment in
the CEE countries increased so much. Up to 10 per cent of the total popu-
lation was jobless in Slovakia, Poland and East Germany. However, it seems
that unemployment is not rising anymore and even has begun to decrease
gradually in some economies, such as for example in Hungary and Slovenia.
With the exception of the Czech Republic, unemployment jumped from a
(state ￿xed) zero level to its maximum within only three or four years. It
is straightforward to see that output can not grow in an economy which
dramatically reduces the input of labor in production.
In this paper we analyze whether bridging the prior productivity gap
with a massive technology transfer in economic transition can be the cause
for the described evolution of productivity, output growth, and unemploy-
ment. In the early 1990s, the considered CEE economies had a relative
productivity of less than half of the EU average. However, after a period of
rapid catching-up some CEE economies left the economically weaker West-
3Even the negative numbers of initial productivity growth in Slovakia and the Czech
Republic can not explain the much deeper fall in output. Moreover, the special situation
with the separation of the two countries could have led to data problems.








































Figure 1: The evolution of labor productivity; Source: wiiw Annual Database on Eastern
Europe, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, and Deutsche Bundes-
bank Monatsberichte.













































Figure 2: The evolution of unemployment; Source: See Figure 1.









































Figure 3: The evolution of GDP; Source: See Figure 1.
6ern EU countries, such as Portugal and Greece, behind. The modernization
of technologies and organizational change helped to close the productivity
gap. This process was related to a restructuring of ￿rms and structural
adjustments with the new emergence and the decline of industries. For ex-
ample, the agricultural sector and the heavy industry were downsized and
replaced with new high-tech ￿rms and an increasing service sector. This
structural and technological adjustments entailed large scale labor realloca-
tion. Evidence for the high job destruction, in particular in the early 1990s,
and large worker ￿ ows in CEE countries can be found in a growing litera-
ture on labor turnover in transition economies (see, for example, Faggio and
Konings, 2003, and Haliwanger and Vodopivec, 2003). Unemployment must
be the consequence of labor reallocation if job creation is relative weak, for
example because the allocation capacity of the labor market is not yet fully
developed or workers represent still old and obsolete skills.
Investment, and in particular foreign direct investment (FDI), plays a
central role in the process of structural and technological adjustments and
knowledge di⁄usion (see Bedi and Cie· slik, 2002, for a short review on this
issue). Indeed, the enlargement and the renewing of the capital stock have
been exceptional in the transition countries. The ratio of investments to
GDP was much higher in CEE than in other European economies and, for
example, in East Germany the ratio was twice as high as in the West during
the 1990s (Pohl, 1999). If capital embodies technologies, investments drive
the technological change. This implies that economic transition has been
accompanied by a rapid implementation of current and highly productive
technologies. For example, Lay (1999) shows for East Germany that the use
of innovative production technologies, such as computer integrated manufac-
turing and computer aided design, di⁄used so quickly that the availability
of these technologies among ￿rms reached the West German level after a
￿ve-year period of catching-up. A further indicator for the new importance
of technologies is the rise in the demand for the complementary skills, for ex-
ample in the East German manufacturing sector (Fitzroy and Funke, 1995),
also apparent in the coinciding increase in the returns to education (Gang
and Yun, 2002).
73 The Model
Transition is modeled as the bridging of a technology gap of a backward
economy which catches up with the global technological frontier via inter-
national technology transfers.4 The technology transfer drives the produc-
tivity growth but we assume that, at the same time, it leads to a technology
turnover and a reallocation of labor.5 The reallocation of labor occurs as
technological progress limits the lifetime of the existing sectors or industries
and thereby causes job destruction, while the implementation of innovative
technologies creates new sectors and vacancies. Frictions in the labor mar-
ket, which hinder the immediate re-employment of job seekers, therefore
result in unemployment. For the analysis of economic growth, we combine
the two concepts of a gap in valuable objects in the form of a lack in capital
and a gap in ideas in terms of antiquated technologies. We then explore how
closing the technology gap relates to variations in employment.
3.1 The Production Side
Consider a transition economy which consists of a continuum of di⁄erent sec-
tors i indexed on the unit interval. The sectors produce a homogenous ￿nal
good Yt, which can be consumed and invested. The ￿ ow of the ￿nal good is
manufactured in each sector with the input of labor Li;t, basic components
of capital goods xi;t, and a continuous set of non-sinking intermediate goods
z in the unit interval so that
R 1
0 zdz = 1. The used technology speci￿es the
quality of the intermediate goods which yields the sector speci￿c productiv-
ity level Ai;t. The capital stock embodies the technology. This means that
we evaluate the capital stock with the value it contains instead of counting
physical units. Therefore, let Ki;t = Aixi;t de￿ne the capital stock of sector
i which includes the basic components xi;t and the corresponding technology
in terms of its productivity Ai;t. Although di⁄erent combinations of xi;t and
Ai;t can result in the same amount of capital, the actual mix matters in such
4The modeling adopts and combines elements from the multi-sector growth model of
Aghion and Howitt (1992) and the convergence setting of Aghion (2005). The signi￿cance
of technology transfers from highly developed to less developed countries has been proven
in di⁄erent studies (see, for example Coe and Helpman, 1995; Xu and Wang, 2000).
5A formalization of the idea that technological change and equilibrium unemployment
are interrelated goes back to Pissarides (see, for example, Pissarides, 2000). Aghion and
Howitt (1994) introduced the destructive e⁄ect of technological progress into a Schumpe-
trian growth model with search in the labor market.
8a way that capital which represents current technologies is superior to the
same stock with more antiquated technologies. This is introduced through
some reject in production which is given by a fraction ￿ of the basic capital
input xi;t. Hence, the output loss is the larger the more basic capital goods




￿ ￿ ￿xi;t: (1)
The technology speci￿es a sector. A new sector arises as soon as a new
technology becomes available as the outcome of a technology transfer (ex-
plained in the next section). However, the emergence of new technologies
makes some old sector technologies obsolete because we assume that there
exists a maximum distance to the current leading productivity level. The
obsolescence ends the production and the sector disappears. This implies
that the technology transfer establishes technological change accompanied
by structural adjustments with the arising and the disappearance of tech-
nologies and sectors.
When a new sector enters the market, it can choose its technology which
will be that with the highest productivity level available in the transition
economy, which is Amax
t . Afterwards, we take the sector technology as ￿xed
and adjustments in the use of capital occur through variations in xi. From
the unchangeable sector technology and the increase in Amax
t over time it
follows that the relative productivity of a sector, ai;t = Ai=Amax
t , gradually
declines from ai = 1 to the exogenously de￿ned minimum level ai = amin.
This implies that di⁄erent relative productivity levels exist coincidently be-
cause sectors emerge one after another. The cross sectional distribution of
relative productivity is then given by the distribution function H(a).
As long as the sector exists, ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts ￿i;t at each
point in time. In consideration of wages wt as labor cost and capital costs
rt, the maximization problem in sector i is
max
Li;t;Ki;t
￿i;t = Yi;t ￿ rtKi;t ￿ wtLi;t: (2)
First order conditions yield the demand for labor and capital, which is low



















As Ai cannot be picked freely, ￿rms accomplish to have the optimal Ki










Perfect mobility of labor implies that wages will always be equalized be-
tween the sectors. A market-clearing wage (not considering later frictions)
indicates that wt is set in such a way that aggregated labor demand is equal
to total labor supply L:
R 1







From this it follows that the wage is
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)(kt)
￿ ; (7)
where kt = Kt=L denotes the capital-labor ratio. Using (7) and (3), we see
that each sector employs a share of the total labor supply equal to the sector
share of the total capital stock. Let ￿(ai) = Ki=K denote this ratio which
yields
Li;t = ￿(ai)L: (8)
Labor input in the sectors varies with the operating technology. An innova-
tive technology with a high relative productivity indicates a high proportion
of total capital and labor input, ￿0(a) > 0:
The amount produced in the economy yields from aggregating output of
the di⁄erent sectors. After substituting the ￿rst order conditions into the




















Some simplifying operations facilitate the interpretation of equation (9) and
identify the sources of growth. Identical shares of capital and labor in-
put of a sector (Ki=K = ￿(ai) = Li=L) imply that all sectors produce
with the same capital-labor ratio kt. From this it follows that according
to the production function the output per worker in sector i is Yi;t=Li =
k￿
t ￿ ￿kt=(aiAmax
t ). Alternatively, the output of sector i is given by Yi;t =
￿(ai)L [k￿
t ￿ ￿kt= (aiAmax







. If we now classify sectors by relative productivity a,
we can sum over a as long as we multiply each single output by the density
h(a). These considerations let us reformulate the expression for Yt so that
we get the nearly standard production function Yt = L1￿￿K￿




However, we add to the standard result that output depends on a measure














The value of & depends positively on the progress made in increasing the pro-
ductivity level Amax. Hence, capital accumulation and technological progress
are the sources of growth. However, note that capital accumulation has
a negative second order e⁄ect because more capital without technological
progress increases the reject in production. Consider furthermore that the
returns to technological change are decreasing as the value of & asymptoti-
cally approaches unity, lim
Amax
t !1
& = 1. This is because equation (11) reduces
to & =
R 1
amin ￿(a), which is equal to one if the growth in the productivity
level is unrestricted over an in￿nite time horizon.
113.2 The Technology Transfer
The transition economy exhibits a technology gap but during transition a
technology transfer from abroad closes the gap. The gap appears in the dif-
ference between the maximum home productivity level Amax
t and the inter-
national frontier level ￿ At. The technology transfer increases the productivity
level of the technology pool de￿ned by the set of intermediate goods. The
productivity level Az of a single intermediate good z varies but the integral
set de￿nes the productivity level
R 1
0 Azdz = Amax
t . The Poisson arrival rate
of a technology transfer over all intermediate goods is ￿ with ￿ 2 [0;1]. We
assume that the technology transfer let the productivity of an intermediate
good jump to the international frontier level ￿ At. Although the arrival rates
of technology transfers for the di⁄erent intermediate goods are independent
from each other, they contribute to the shared pool of technological knowl-
edge. In a share (1 ￿ ￿) of the intermediate goods no technology transfer
takes place. This leaves their contribution to the available technology pool
at the pre-period level Amax
t￿1 . As the in￿ ux of foreign knowledge into the
technology pool is thus ￿ ￿ At, the current maximum productivity level is
Amax
t = ￿ ￿ At + (1 ￿ ￿)Amax
t￿1 : (12)
Suppose that the global technology frontier ￿ At grows at the constant






denote the relative proximity to this frontier which measures the technology
gap during transition. It follows immediately that the distance variable
evolves over time according to:
￿t = ￿ +
1 ￿ ￿
1 + ￿ g
￿t￿1: (14)
It is straightforward to see that the economy approaches the global tech-
nology frontier if ￿ > ￿ g￿t￿1=(1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿t￿1). In the case of the European
transition countries, we can say that ￿ switched from zero to a positive
value at the moment when the fall of the iron curtain allowed for an inward
technology transfer. The technology transfer gradually closes the technology
gap if the value ￿ is large enough. However, the economy will not reach or
12even move the frontier ￿ At unless home research contributes to the global
technology pool. Instead, the di⁄erence equation has
￿￿ = ￿
1 + ￿ g
￿ g + ￿
(15)
as a unique ￿xed point which indicates the end of economic transition. But
beforehand, the rate of change in Amax
t , which is gt, exceeds the global rate
￿ g and the convergence to the global frontier can be written as
gt = ￿
￿





We can interpret ￿ in the equation as the arrival rate of technological im-
provements while the following term indicates their magnitude. The value
of gt is obviously the larger the more the economy is behind the global tech-
nology level, namely the smaller ￿t￿1 is. This is because the jump in the
productivity level of each intermediate good is large if the di⁄erence in the
levels ￿ At and Amax
t is large. Consequently, the rate gt decreases over time
and becomes equal to its global counterpart ￿ g as soon as ￿t = ￿￿.
3.3 Growth and the Long Run Equilibrium
While the technology transfer and capital accumulation generate growth
during transition, the long-run equilibrium is characterized by a steady state
with a constant output level in per capita units. From the production func-
tion yt = k￿
t &t(Amax
t ;￿) it follows that output per capita grows as long as
the capital-labor ratio and the stage of technological development increase.
Technological progress is a continuous process, even though the output ef-
fect of a growing Amax
t decreases. As the steady state we have & = 1 and
technological progress has no further e⁄ect on growth. This implies that the
production function converges to the case yt = k￿
t .6 Moreover, the capital-
labor ratio will approach its equilibrium value k￿ if we assume the standard
properties of the neoclassical growth model.
We consider a closed economy in which saving is equal to investment.7
6This holds only if A
max
t grows fast compared to k, that is if g > (1 ￿
￿)(kt ￿ kt￿1)=kt￿1: This is true in the steady state as the rate of technological progress
is positive, whereas kt = kt￿1.
7We ignore here FDI which played an important role in the transition process of the
CEE countries. The introduction of FDI would not change the main results of the model
but it would have implications for welfare and the speed of transition.
13Individuals consume a share of their income and use the remainder for sav-
ings, which should be a constant fraction s of income during transition but
is subject to preferences in the long-run. Investments lead to capital accu-
mulation but capital depreciation opposes the increase in the capital stock.
Capital that represents outdated technologies su⁄ers a higher depreciation.
This is modeled in the way that depreciation a⁄ects only basic capital units
x. The di⁄erence equation of the capital-labor ratio therefore is





t increases over time which substitutes the use of ba-
sic capital units. Finally, the demand for x disappears in equilibrium and
equation (17) reduces to kt ￿ kt￿1 = sk￿
t￿1.
As soon as economic transition is over, transition towards a steady state
can be considered. Savings are assumed to be constant during economic
transition. However, we introduce a steady state as a long-run basing point
to illustrate that the model converges to the neoclassical growth model under
the assumption of utility maximization. Hence, only the long-run equilib-
rium considers preferences and that a variable share of income can be used
for consumption. Consumption generates the utility v(ct) and, with ￿ as the
discount factor of the representative individual, the in￿nitely-lived consumer
has a present value utility of V =
P1
t=T ￿t￿Tu(ct) at time T after economic
transition. Then, the optimization problem is to maximize V subject to
kt = kt￿1+stk￿
t￿1. In the end, the standard procedure of dynamic optimiza-










The model converges to the simple neoclassical growth model in the long
run. Technological progress in the steady state leads only to an extension
of the sector interval but has no e⁄ects on growth. Therefore, the long-run
equilibrium of the model is a steady state without growth in output and
consumption. However, signi￿cant growth e⁄ects arise during transition
as long as capital is accumulated, the stage of technological development
changes, and the employment level varies over time.
143.4 Growth during Transition and Labor Reallocation
Growth and employment during transition depend on the speed of the tech-
nology transfer. While the direct e⁄ect of the technology transfer on produc-
tivity growth is strictly positive, bridging the technology gap combined with
technology obsolescence may involve negative consequences for employment,
capital formation, and growth. A fall in employment and capital deprecia-
tion that exceeds new investments cause a output loss. In combination with
the productivity increases it yields the macroeconomic pattern of transition.
Fluctuations in employment result from the continuous reallocation of
labor. In particular early stages of economic transition are accompanied by
technological change and structural adjustments that produce a degree of
job destruction which is higher than the corresponding job creation.8 Job
destruction arises due to the fact that gradual technological obsolescence in
combination with a minimum technology level causes the closure of the ￿rms
a⁄ected by the obsolescence of their technologies, and the dismissal of the
￿rm￿ s employees. As the wage freely balances demand and supply of labor,
no unemployment occurs if dismissals face the same amount of reemploy-
ment. In contrast to this, we henceforth consider frictions in the matching
process between unemployed and jobs which prevent dismissed workers from
immediately reentering the workforce. This means that aggregate labor in-
put is only a share of total labor supply N,
Lt = (1 ￿ ut)N; (19)
where u denotes the unemployment rate.
Sectors with a productivity level that reaches a value below amin stop
production and dismiss all their former employees. The inward technology
transfer continuously raises the maximum productivity level Amax
t of the
latest technology, but this implies that relative productivity a of the other
technologies declines over time. At some stage the level of a sector i falls
below amin and the sector disappears. Hence, only those sectors survive the
technological change at date t which had a relative productivity of ai;t￿1 ￿
(1 + g)amin in the previous period t ￿ 1. The faster maximum productivity
grows, i.e. the higher gt is, the fewer sectors survive a period. This means
that a large technology transfer produces a high sector turnover. Workers
8See Haltiwanger, Lehmann and Terell (2003).
15that were employed in sectors with amin ￿ ai;t￿1 < (1+gt)amin at date t￿1
fall victim to the structural change at t because their ￿rms cannot hold a
level above or equal to amin. As sectors employ a share ￿(a) of the total
labor input L = (1 ￿ ut)N, the integral over the sectors between amin and
(1 + gt)amin yields the total number of destroyed jobs:
U+




The re-entry into employment is always lower than the number of unem-
ployed workers as we consider frictions in the matching between job seekers
and jobs. For simplicity we assume a linear matching technology, where a
constant share ￿ of the unemployed ￿nds a new job:
U￿
t = ￿utN: (21)
This simple form of the matching implies that ￿ is the indicator for the
magnitude of the frictions. The relative e⁄ect of technological change and
sector turnover on employment is the higher the lower ￿ is.
Unemployment will rise as long as U+
t exceeds U￿
t , and the other way
around. The unemployment rate therefore evolves according to ut ￿ut￿1 =
(U+ ￿ U￿)=N, which yields










Changes in the employment level as well as variations in the quantity and
technological quality of the capital stock cause economic ￿ uctuations. Out-
put per capita (instead of per worker) results from the production function
with unemployment Yt=N = yN
t = (1 ￿ ut)k￿
t &t . While bridging the tech-
nology gap continuously increases the stage of technological development &
and contributes strictly positive to output growth during transition, it is not
clear whether the capital-labor ratio and the employment rate increase or
decrease. The depreciation of obsolete capital works against investments and
the labor reallocation can result in a rise or a decline in employment. Accord-
ingly, we examine in the next step under which condition ￿ut = ut ￿ ut￿1
and ￿kt = kt ￿ kt￿1 produce a positive or negative impact on growth.
Deviations from equilibrium unemployment e ut determine whether ￿u
16is positive or negative. Equilibrium unemployment is de￿ned as the iden-
tity between job creation U￿ and job destruction U+ so that the share of
employed and unemployed workers is constant, even though there are con-
tinuous ￿ ows between employment and unemployment. Set ut = ut￿1 in








Equivalently, deviations from a constant capital-labor ratio e kt give informa-
tion about the direction of changes in k. The temporary equilibrium9 ratio
e kt follows from the identity between investments and the capital deprecia-
tion. Setting kt = kt￿1 in equation (17) yields the identity syt = ’xt=Lt.










The dashed lines e u and e kt in Figure 4 show the locus of constant un-
employment and a constant capital-labor ratio in the (￿;u)-space and the
(￿;k)-space, respectively. As the technology transfer continuously increases
￿t over time, the horizontal axis is also the time axis. The e u￿locus is down-
ward sloped because the value of the integral in equation (23) declines as
soon as g falls with an increase in ￿.10 Therefore, we know that equilib-
rium unemployment e ut will be high if the distance to the global technology
frontier is still large. The intuition behind this is that a large technology
gap indicates that much structural adjustment is necessary to bridge the
gap, which causes job destruction and unemployment. In addition to this,
we have the e kt￿locus which is upward sloped. If the transition economy
approaches the global technology frontier, i.e. ￿ increases, output and in-
vestments grow and the relative capital depreciation decreases as the capital
stock contains fewer (accelerated obsolescing) basic capital goods. More in-
vestment and less depreciation correspond to an increase in the equilibrium
capital-labor ratio during transition.
The loci of equilibrium unemployment and the equilibrium capital-labor
9In contrast to the long-run equilibrium k
￿, the temporary equilibrium e kt does not
consider individual preferences and its value shifts over time.
10The fact that g and ￿ are inversely correlated follows directly from equation (16).





amin ￿(a)da ￿ ￿ < 0: (25)
Taking into account that ￿e u = 0, the inverse relationship @￿ut/@u implies
that unemployment will increase as long as it is below the equilibrium value,
ut < e ut, and fall if ut > e ut. Furthermore
@￿kt
@k
= (￿ ￿ 1)sk￿￿2& < 0 (26)
indicates an increase in the capital-labor ratio for ratios below equilibrium,
kt < e kt; and a decrease if kt > e kt.
We interpret the evolution of k and u as the short-term adjustment to
the equilibrium path right after the start of the transition process, and the
movement along the equilibrium path afterwards. The solid lines in Figure
4 show this evolution under the assumption that the transition economy
starts with u0 < e u0 and k0 > e k0. While unemployment in the centrally-
planed CEE countries was ￿xed at the zero level, the use of rather outdated
capital was high. This and the fact that the technology gap was large in
the beginning (i.e. e k0 is small) let us argue that the transition started with
unemployment lower than e u0 and with a capital-labor ratio higher than e k0.
From this it follows that unemployment moves quickly from zero to the high
equilibrium value e ut. However, from that point on, unemployment follows
the decreasing e ut￿locus when the technology gap gradually closes. Further-
more, the value of kt above equilibrium leads to a downward adjustment
through the fast depreciation of obsolete capital. As soon as the falling kt
hits the e kt-locus, the capital-labor ratio follows the upward path and capital
accumulation exceeds depreciation again.
The model reproduces the experiences of macroeconomic transition in
the CEE economies. Bridging the technology gap generates a [-shaped
pattern of the capital-labor ratio and a inverted-[-shaped pattern of unem-
ployment. The mechanism behind this is the structural adjustment which
causes the depreciation of some outdated capital and results in an accel-
erated reallocation of labor. The productivity gains from the technology
transfer cannot outweigh the lack of inputs if the decline in employment
and useful capital is substantial. From this it follows that output growth is







Figure 4: Dynamics of capital and unemployment along a closing ￿￿gap
sequent catching-up. Hence, after the shock-like adjustments with the initial
collapse in production, a moderate evolution to the long-run equilibrium is
accompanied by a reduction in unemployment and continuous growth.
4 Transition Scenarios
This section compares the trends of productivity and output growth, un-
employment and the capital-labor ratio under the assumption of di⁄erent
initial and transition conditions. To illustrate the possible variations in the
general shape of the transition paths, we simulate the evolution over time of
gt;ut and kt given by the di⁄erence equations (16), (17), and (22) and the








For the baseline scenario we specify the set of parameters fk0;￿0;u0;￿;
amin;￿;￿; ￿ g;￿;’;s
￿
. As the main initial conditions, we assume that the
capital-labor ratio is k0 = 2 and the technology gap yields ￿0 = 0:5. This
combination yields a realistic capital-output ratio of about 2.5 and re￿ ects
the fact that relative productivity of the CEE countries has been at maxi-
mum half of the EU average in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the economy
of the simulation starts with full employment. We choose the parameters
a⁄ecting the reallocation of labor in such a way that the numbers reproduce
19a level of about 3% to 5% job creation and 5% to 10% job destruction which
has been found in the transition countries during the 1990s (see Faggio and
Konings, 2003). Hence, frictions are given by ￿ = 0:3 and the minimum
productivity by amin = 0:7. The rate of technology transfer is assumed to
bridge 30 per cent of the previous gap (￿ = 0:3). This number generates
rates of productivity growth of more than 10% at the beginning and repro-
duces the real catching-up process in the CEE economies. For the remaining
parameters of the model we assume that the capital share takes the usual
value ￿ = 0:3, the ratio of investments to output is 20% (roughly the ac-
tual value during the 1990s), and the global rate of technological progress is
￿ g = 0:03; equal to the average over the last decades. Finally, some parame-
ters cannot be based on real observations but we have to make reasonable
guesses. Therefore, we assume that the reject due to antiquated technologies
￿ is equal to a share of 10% of the basic components of the capital input
and the depreciation rate of capital ’ is 0:1.
After the choice of parameters, and then at each point in time again,
we identify the corresponding employment share, the output level, and the
technology gap. In a next step, we determine how much productivity in
terms of the technology stage & converges to equilibrium and to what extent
this changes job creation and job destruction, the capital-labor ratio, and
output growth. Table 1 reveals the results and con￿rms the ￿ndings of the
previous section. The speed of technological change slows down over time,
while the capital-labor ratio decreases ￿rst but increases afterwards, whereas
the opposite holds true for unemployment. The adjustments are strong in
the beginning and more moderate afterwards. The transition phases out as
soon as the period of structural adjustments is over (after about 50 periods
in the simulation). Then unemployment is in equilibrium and the technology
gap remains at a constant level. In subsequent periods, the growth rate of
output declines further and approaches zero, which characterizes the long-
run equilibrium.
Variations in the parameter values, see Table 2, proof the relative ro-
bustness of the results. Furthermore, they provide an insight into why some
countries in transition have higher rates of changes in output and employ-
ment than others. Figures 4 to 7 refer to this analysis. Selected results from
the comparative simulations are discussed below.
The ￿rst scenario shows that unemployment during the transition is
20Table 1: Dynamics of capital, output, unemployment, and the technology gap








1 2.28 0.5 0.61 0.21 - 0.09 0.11
2 2.20 0.63 0.68 0.28 - 0.03 0.06
3 2.08 0.73 0.73 0.29 0.02 0.05
4 1.96 0.79 0.76 0.27 0.05 0.04
5 1.88 0.84 0.79 0.24 0.06 0.03
...
50 2.26 0.94 0.89 0.03 0.01 0.01
...
1000 396.4 0.94 1 0.03 0 0
lower if the initial technology gap is smaller. This is because less structural
adjustment is necessary which corresponds to less labor reallocation, the
cause of unemployment. A less restrictive level of the minimum technology
in scenario two works in the same direction as it lowers job destruction.
Additionally, this is accompanied by a clearly lower growth depression. Ob-
viously, if basic capital units are depreciated at a higher rate, the larger
loss of capital transmits into an additional loss of output (scenario three).
A reduction in the in￿ ow rate of the technology transfer in scenario four
produces a growth path which is more moderate during the whole transition
because less structural adjustment occurs accompanied by lower ￿ ows in
the labor market. This means a lower depression in the beginning but also
less growth in subsequent periods. Scenario ￿ve reveals that a higher initial
capital-labor ratio helps to avoid the deep depression. Though depreciation
is high, the renewing of the capital stock is particularly e⁄ective as a high
capital-labor ratio in the early stage of transition indicates more out-dated
technologies. While the acceleration of the exogenous technological progress
in scenario six has only little e⁄ects during the transition, it a⁄ects equi-
librium unemployment because the long-term labor reallocation and sector
turnover are higher under this assumption. As expected, the increased ratio
of investments to output in scenario seven accelerates capital accumulation
and involves positive e⁄ects on growth during transition. Anything which
improves job creation, such as training, administrative support for job seek-
ers et cetera, absorbs to some extent the negative employment e⁄ects of the
structural adjustments. Hence, less frictions in scenario eight generate more
21employment and growth. Scenario nine analyzes a rise in the capital share
and shows that the evolution of output growth is less ￿ uctuating because
employment variations lose impact.
Table 2: Parameter variations
￿0 amin ’ ￿ k0 1+￿ g s ￿ ￿ ￿
baseline scenario 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.3 2 1.03 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
scenario 1 0.6 . . . . . . . . .
scenario 2 . 0.6 . . . . . . . .
scenario 3 . . 0.3 . . . . . . .
scenario 4 . . . 0.2 . . . . . .
scenario 5 . . . . 3 . . . . .
scenario 6 . . . . . 1.05 . . . .
scenario 7 . . . . . . 0.3 . . .
scenario 8 . . . . . . . 0.5 . .
scenario 9 . . . . . . . . 0.5 .
scenario 10 . . . . . . . . . 0.05
The simulations show that it is not a simple task to ￿nd the right re-
sponses to the economic challenges during transition. First, initial condi-
tions, such as the magnitude of the technology gap, determine the following
evolution of employment and growth to a large extent. Secondly, the often
arising trade-o⁄ between early depression and later output growth implies
that there are no unambiguous growth policies. A deep depression is the
sign of heavy structural adjustments, which, in turn, are the source of fu-
ture growth. However, two ￿ndings may be important to achieve a good
performance in terms of growth and employment during economic transi-
tion. Investments help to di⁄use technologies and work against the capital
depreciation because of technological obsolescence. And, ￿nally, a reduction
in the frictions in the labor reallocation between old and modern sectors,
for example through extensive training and schooling, is very bene￿cial in
terms of both employment and growth.
Moreover, the comparative simulations might be used to account for
some di⁄erences in the evolution of unemployment and growth in the CEE
countries. We cannot evaluate di⁄erent policies in detail, such as privatiza-
tion progress, labor market reforms and the like. However, in an exemplary
way, confronting the simulations with the real macroeconomic transition, as
22it is displayed in section two, shows how the results gained from the para-
meter variations above ￿t the existing diversity of the transition paths. For
example: In comparison to the average, the Czech Republic had less pro-
ductivity growth and less increase in unemployment in the early 1990s. This
is in line with the predictions of the model in simulation four. If there is,
for some reason, less inward technology transfer, only few structural adjust-
ments occur and job destruction is low. This avoids jumps in joblessness,
but at the price of lower rates of productivity and output growth.
The counter-example is East Germany. The high political and economi-
cal pressure to restructure the economy in order to achieve equalization be-
tween West and East and the rapid technology transfer make East Germany
being the ideal case of a transition economy with a rapid obsolescence and
a high innovation of technologies. The loss of employment was higher than
on average, the initial increase in productivity was remarkable high, and the
rates of output growth ￿ uctuated more than in other CEE countries. It is
fair to argue that the technology transfer was exceptional high from West
to East Germany. This is again in line with scenario four, in which a higher
speed of transition produces a higher rate of productivity growth, but higher
unemployment and a deeper depression at the same time. Moreover, one
can argue that the minimum technological level was particularly restrictive
in East Germany due to the high competition from West German ￿rms. As
fast increasing wages did not compensate for productivity disadvantages,
only the highly productive East German ￿rms survived. According to sce-
nario two this also explains the high degree of labor reallocation with its
side e⁄ects unemployment and the initial output fall.
Finally, Slovenia had a moderate evolution in all macroeconomic vari-
ables. At the same time, the relative high productivity level in the 1990
indicates that Slovenia was the most developed CEE economy before tran-
sition. According to scenario one, a smaller technology gap means a lower
depression, lower unemployment, but also less productivity growth during

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the early 1990, the Central and Eastern European economies established
so-called "big-bang" reforms in nearly every economic area. The conse-
quences could be seen in the evolution of the three central macroeconomic
indicators: Productivity increased rapidly but unemployment jumped to
very high levels and output growth followed the shape of a J-curve with
an initial collapse of production. This paper presents a model which repro-
duces the ￿ uctuating transition paths analyzing the link between structural
adjustment, technology replacement, and labor reallocation.
We consider economies that show a technology gap at the beginning of
transition. Bridging the gap is accompanied by increases in productivity
and sectoral change. The high rate of labor reallocation one can observe in
the CEE countries, in particular at the beginning of transition when job de-
struction dominated job creation (Haltiwanger et al., 2003), is an indicator
for the deep structural transformation during the 1990s. We argue that this
transformation was initiated by the new availability of a pool of superior
(Western) technologies. While the inward technology transfer has positive
e⁄ects on productivity, the consequent obsolescence of old technologies in-
cludes some negative side-e⁄ects on capital accumulation and employment.
From this we get the paradox result of technology updating during transi-
tion, which is that bridging the technology gap increases productivity but
reduces output growth and even leads to negative growth rates due to the
initial sharp rise in unemployment.
The results of our simulations imply that the policy impact on the macro-
economic variables during transition is weak because much of the ￿ uctuation
is subject to initial conditions such as the magnitude of the technology gap.
However, the e¢ ciency of reallocating labor between old and new jobs could
be identi￿ed as one of the major keys to achieve a better performance in
terms of employment and growth during transition. As the characteristics of
the newly created jobs, such as in the services, di⁄er substantially from the
destroyed ones, for example in the heavy industry, the retraining of workers
is supposed to be a necessary condition to reduce the frictions in the labor
market. But further research on the role of skills, skill formation and the
technology-skill complementarity during economic transformation is needed
to identify the frictions in the labor market and to evaluate the role of skill
shortages as a cause of the output fall in transition.
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